Women’s Civic and Political Participation in the Developing World: Obstacles and Opportunities

This article provides a multidisciplinary overview and synthesis of recent scholarship on strategies to increase women’s civic and political participation in the developing world. Using a systematic method for meta-analysis, we identify points of consensus in the literature as well as debates and gaps where future research on strengthening women’s participation is needed. Strategies to increase women\u27s civic and political participation that emerge in the literature include: establishing quotas to enhance women\u27s representation; using social media platforms to mobilize women and amplify their voices; implementing policies and programs that target women as participants or beneficiaries; and mobilizing women through their intersecting identities. We discuss the opportunities inherent in these strategies, as well as their limits. A secondary goal of this article is to provide a useful guide to recent English language literature on women’s civic and political participation for an international women\u27s studies audience. The article includes a link to our Rapid Knowledge Map (RKM, a searchable excel file) that summarizes information about the over 400 studies that we reviewed using an adapted version of the Cochrane method. We hope this resource will be of use to other scholars

Proposal of serovars 17 and 18 of Actinobacillus pleuropneumoniae based on serological and genotypic analysis

The aim of this study was to investigate isolates of Actinobacillus pleuropneumoniae previously designated serologically either as NT or as ‘K2:07’, which did not produce serovar-specific amplicons in PCR assays. We used whole genome sequencing to identify the capsule (CPS) loci of six previously designated biovar 1 non-typable (NT) and two biovar 1 ‘K2:O7’ isolates of A. pleuropneumoniae from Denmark, as well as a recent biovar 2 NT isolate from Canada. All of the NT isolates have the same six-gene type I CPS locus, sharing common cpsABC genes with serovars 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11 and 13. The two ‘K2:O7’ isolates contain a unique three-gene type II CPS locus, having a cpsA gene similar to that of serovars 1, 4, 12, 14 and 15. The previously NT isolates share the same O-antigen genes, found between erpA and rpsU, as serovars 3, 6, 8, and 15. Whereas the ‘K2:O7’ isolates, have the same O-antigen genes as serovar 7, which likely contributed to their previous mis-identification. All of the NT and ‘K2:O7’ isolates have only the genes required for production of ApxII (apxIICA structural genes, and apxIBD export genes). Rabbit polyclonal antisera raised against representative isolates with these new CPS loci demonstrated distinct reactivity compared to the 16 known serovars. The serological and genomic results indicate that the isolates constitute new serovars 17 (previously NT) and 18 (previously ‘K2:O7’). Primers designed for amplification of specific serovar 17 and 18 sequences for molecular diagnostics will facilitate epidemiological tracking of these two new serovars of A. pleuropneumoniae

Evaluation of a novel rash scale and a serum proteomic predictor in a randomized phase II trial of sequential or concurrent cetuximab and pemetrexed in previously treated non-small cell lung cancer

BACKGROUND: Candidate predictive biomarkers for epidermal growth factor receptor inhibitors (EGFRi), skin rash and serum proteomic assays, require further qualification to improve EGFRi therapy in non-small cell lung cancer (NSCLC). In a phase II trial that was closed to accrual because of changes in clinical practice we examined the relationships among candidate biomarkers, quantitative changes in tumor size, progression-free and overall survival. METHODS: 55 patients with progressive NSCLC after platinum therapy were randomized to receive (Arm A) cetuximab, followed by pemetrexed at progression, or (Arm B) concurrent cetuximab and pemetrexed. All received cetuximab monotherapy for the first 14 days. Pre-treatment serum and weekly rash assessments by standard and EGFRi-induced rash (EIR) scales were collected. RESULTS: 43 patients (20-Arm A, 23-Arm B) completed the 14-day run-in. Median survival was 9.1 months. Arm B had better median overall (Arm B = 10.3 [95% CI 7.5, 16.8]; Arm A = 3.5 [2.8, 11.7] months P = 0.046) and progression-free survival (Arm B = 2.3 [1.6, 3.1]; Arm A = 1.6 [0.9, 1.9] months P = 0.11). The EIR scale distributed ratings among 6 rather than 3 categories but ordinal scale rash severity did not predict outcomes. The serum proteomic classifier and absence of rash after 21 days of cetuximab did. CONCLUSIONS: Absence of rash after 21 days of cetuximab therapy and the serum proteomic classifier, but not ordinal rash severity, were associated with NSCLC outcomes. Although in a small study, these observations were consistent with results from larger retrospective analyses. TRIAL REGISTRATION: Clinicaltrials.gov Identifier NCT0020393

Comparative sequence analysis of the capsular polysaccharide loci of Actinobacillus pleuropneumoniae serovars 1-18, and development of two multiplex PCRs for comprehensive capsule typing

Problems with serological cross-reactivity have led to development of a number of PCRs (individual and multiplex) for molecular typing of Actinobacillus pleuropneumoniae, the causative agent of porcine pleuropneumonia. Most of these assays were developed for detection of specific amplicons within capsule biosynthetic genes before the availability of complete sequences for the different serovars. Here we describe comparative analysis of the complete capsular loci for all 18 serovars of A. pleuropneumoniae, and development of two multiplex PCRs for comprehensive capsule typing of this important pig pathogen

The Importance of Choice: Political Intermediaries and Democratization in Egypt After the Arab Spring

Is post-revolution Egypt demonstrably different from the ancien régime? Where and between whom is political competition currently taking place? In the aggregative conception, democracy requires the presence of substantive political choice, differentiated through \u27robust\u27 competition between intermediaries – most often political parties – that serve to effectively aggregate and articulate political preferences. This produces an observable and genuine link between public preferences and government policies. In Egypt, the lack of a coheren and viable alternative to the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) – itself an amalgamation of conflicting and particularistic interests – has deprived the people of any substantive political choice. Further, because the FJP is governing largely via thin electoral victories (in terms of voter turnout) – derived from a high reliance upon clientelistic campaign tactics – democratic linkage is largely absent in Egypt. As a result, the current Egyptian regime is suffering from a \u27legitimacy gap\u27 exemplified by increased tensions with the Judiciary, an inability to effectively enact government economic policy, threats of election boycotts by the major secular opposition parties, and violent popular outbreaks reflecting severe discontent and disillusionment. Recent commentary on the Arab Spring has tended to frame the issue in terms of secular/Islamist and economic cleavages. However, an analysis of studies looking at the 2011-12 parliamentary elections, combined with recent public opinion data collected by Benstead, et al. (2013) and the Arab Barometer, shows that the absence of substantive political choice in Egypt is what is actually stalling democratization

United Discourse, Divided Struggles: Hegemonic Contraction And Social Movements In Jordan

Between 2011 and 2013, thousands of protests, marches, and strikes swept across the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in a mass rebuke of decades of economic deprivation and stalled democratic reforms. In addition to their scale, what made these mobilizations unprecedented was the participation of two new social movements: a new independent labor movement and the “Hirak.” The Hirak (or “movement”) was comprised of dozens of Jordanian tribal youth groups drawn from rural communities which had, until recently, been among the most steadfast supporters of the monarchy. Both labor—organizing outside the state-controlled unions—and Hirak activists shared a similar discourse of economic rights and social justice. Nevertheless, activists failed to form a broadly-based national movement and were divided and demobilized by 2013. Consequently, the monarchy survived the tumult of the “Arab Uprising,” which toppled regimes in Egypt, Tunisia, and elsewhere. This dramatic turn of events informs the central empirical puzzle of this dissertation: Why were activists in Jordan, despite sharing many of the same motivations and demands, unable to coalesce around a single, national movement capable of challenging the monarchy\u27s grip on power?Drawing on in-depth interviews with key activists, this dissertation offers an answer to this question by tracing how neoliberal reforms eroded the Jordanian regime’s hegemony, creating the opportunity for new cross-movement solidarities to emerge. Hegemony in this sense refers to the economic, institutional, and ideological mechanisms and processes by which ruling coalitions (re)produce popular consent to the prevailing order. In tracing the erosion of hegemony, this study emphasizes the importance of structural factors over primarily institutional and cultural explanations of why the Arab Uprisings “missed” Jordan, while also explicating precisely how and why structural factors were relevant. Through a “representative” case study applying comparative historical analysis, discourse analysis, and cross-case comparative methods, I arrive at three main findings: (1) that the timing and composition of transgressive social mobilization in Jordan, beginning in the mid-2000s, can be traced back to the uneven contraction of hegemony across material, institutional, and ideological dimensions; (2) these early labor movements created the conditions for cross-movement solidarities to develop between workers’ struggles and broader popular protests leading up to and during the 2011 uprisings in Jordan; and (3) that the state perceived such coalitions as constituting a meaningful threat to authoritarian control, responding with targeted concessions and divisive rhetoric to exploit differences across “economic” and “political” struggles. By establishing both the overlooked importance and vulnerabilities of labor-nonlabor movement solidarities in challenging authoritarianism, and their relationship to dynamics of hegemony, this study contributes to academic debates about the role of structural factors in social mobilization and challenges to authoritarianism from below

Liberalization, Contention, and Threat: Institutional Determinates of Societal Preferences and the Arab Spring in Tunisia and Morocco

Why do revolutions happen? What role do structures, institutions, and actors play in precipitating (or preventing) them? Finally, What might compel social mobilization against a regime in the face of potentially insurmountable odds? These questions are all fundamentally about state-society (strategic) interactions, and elite and societal preference formation over time. The self-immolation of Muhammad Bouazizi in Sidi Bouzid on December 17, 2010, served as a focal point upon which over twenty years of corrupt, coercive authoritarian rule were focused into a single, unified challenge to the Ben Ali regime. The regime\u27s brutality was publicized via social media activism and satellite television, precipitating mass mobilization across Tunisia and, eventually, throughout the region and beyond. In light of the rapid and unforeseen nature of these events, scholars writing about the causes of the Arab Spring have focused their critiques on scholarship that they felt overemphasized the role of institutions and elite-level actors over \u27under the radar\u27 changes within society. This paper essentially agrees with this point of view, but is not content to simply \u27throw out\u27 institutionalism. As Timur Kuran (1991) argued in the wake of the unforeseen collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, one cannot understand revolution without understanding the \u27true\u27 preferences of social actors. In this way, the inevitability of revolutionary surprises seems a given so long as analysts continue to look from the top-down. Yet, this paper contends that institutions do still matter. They matter because different institutional arrangements incentivize and constrain regime strategies, which, in turn, inform the strategic calculations and preference orderings within society. These two societal variables are determined - in part - by the degree of regime flexibility, and they affect whether, how, and where social actors choose to vent their dissent. This paper proposes a model for the development of contentious social mobilization under authoritarianism. In order to do so, two models - one game-theoretic, and the other rooted in the contentious politics subfield of political sociology - are synthesized toward elucidating how altered societal preferences affect strategic interactions between the regime and society over time and during acute contentious episodes. The synthesized model is then illustrated through narrative case studies of two North African states that experienced divergent outcomes in the wake of the Arab Spring: Tunisia and Morocco. The limited spaces and institutions for the expression of dissent in Tunisia gradually changed societal preferences over time. In 2010, Tunisians\u27 preferences shifted from various socioeconomic demands and other issue-specific grievances toward a galvanized demand for the fall of the regime. In Morocco, on the other hand, social actors, by and large, continued to prefer limited reforms to a complete upheaval of the political system. This paper contends that this divergence in preferences and therefore outcomes was in part determined by the variation in the two regimes\u27 respective strategic mixes of concessions and/or coercion. To the extent that such strategies and institutions were more flexible - i.e. were more permissive of (limited) political contention and contestation - social movements were less likely to become emboldened against the regime